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Abstract 
The paper investigates the impact of remittances on the relative concerns of 
households in rural China. Using the Rural to Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) 
dataset we estimate a series of well-being functions to simultaneously explore the 
relative concerns with respect to income and remittances. Our results show that 
although rural households experience substantial utility loss due to income 
comparisons, they gain utility by comparing their remittances with those received by 
their reference group. In other words, we find evidence of a “status-effect” with 
respect to income and of a “signal-effect” with respect to remittances. The magnitudes 
of these two opposite effects are very similar, implying that the utility reduction due 
to relative income is compensated by the utility gain due to relative remittances. This 
finding is robust to various specifications, controlling for the endogeneity of 
remittances and selective migration, as well as a measure of current migrants’ net 
remittances calculated using counterfactual income and expenditures.  
Key Words: positional concerns; remittances; subjective well-being 
JEL Classification: C90, D63 
 
 
 
 
 
*Acknowledgements:  The Longitudinal Survey on Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) 
consists of three components: the Urban Household Survey, the Rural Household Survey and Migrant 
Household Survey. It was initiated by a group of researchers at the Australian National    University, 
the University of Queensland and the Beijing Normal University. The survey has been supported by 
[the Chinese Foundation of Social Sciences and] the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), which also 
developed and provides the Scientific Use Files. We are grateful to participants at the session 
“Remittances, Job Search and Risk Attitudes in China” of the 10th IZA/World Bank Conference on 
Employment and Development in Bonn for useful comments.  
 
Corresponding Author: Alpaslan Akay, University of Gothenburg and IZA. Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-
9, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Telephone:  +46 (31) 786 4122.  
a University of Gothenburg and IZA - alpaslan.akay@economics.gu.se 
b Aix-Marseille Université and IZA - olivier.bargin@univ-amu.fr  
c IZA – giulietti@iza.org  
d Cornell University - jr872@cornell.edu  
e IZA and Bonn University – zimmermann@iza.org  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
For the past three decades China has been experiencing an enormous movement of 
workers from rural towards urban areas. Recent estimates show that about 155 million 
people have left their rural residence to work in urban areas (Cai et al., 2011). Due to 
hukou restrictions, migrants’ spouses and children are often left behind in villages, 
making remittances a crucial source of income to “compensate” for the migrant’s 
absence. Estimates suggest that migrants sent about US $30 billion to rural areas in 
2005 (Gong et al., 2008). Such large cash flows have important and complex effects 
not only on the welfare of family members left behind, but also on the development, 
income distribution and welfare of rural villages (e.g., Acosta et al., 2008; Howell, 
2014). This paper investigates how remittances affect the relative (or positional) 
concerns of rural households using subjective well-being (SWB hereafter) as a proxy 
for the experienced utility (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005).  
An emerging strand of the literature has put forward the idea that individuals’ welfare 
does not only depend on their income’s absolute level but also on relative concerns, 
that is, on how individuals compare their income with that of other relevant people 
(Clark et al., 2008; Senik, 2008). The effect of relative concerns has been analyzed 
using SWB data from existing surveys (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 
2008) or by collecting survey experimental data (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; 
Carlsson et al., 2007; Akay et al., 2012).1 Both approaches suggest that the relative 
income substantially affects individuals’ utility. In the non-experimental approach, the 
role of relative concerns is captured by introducing the average income of other 
individuals (the reference group) as an additional control variable in SWB regressions 
conditional on individuals’ absolute income and other characteristics. Evidence from 
developed countries suggests that the reference group’s mean income negatively 
affects utility. Such a result is compatible with the presence of a status-effect 
reflecting feelings such as envy (Luttmer, 2005; Clark et al., 2008).  
Yet, empirical studies from less developed or transition countries report small, 
                                                 
1 The second approach to investigate the positional concerns is based on tailored survey experiments 
constructed to explicitly identify the relative concerns. This method allows for identifying positional 
concerns both for income and consumption of specific goods, such as cars and holidays (see, e.g., 
Alpizar et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, 2005; Akay et al., 2011, 
2013).  
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sometimes positive impact from relative concerns (see for South Africa: Kingdon and 
Knight, 2007; Bookwalter and Dalenberg, 2009; Ethiopia:  Akay and Martinsson, 
2011; Akay et al., 2011; China: Appleton and Song, 2008; Knight et al., 2009; Knight 
and Gunatilaka, 2010; Akay et al., 2012; Poland: Senik 2004, 2005, 2008; Russia: 
Ravillion and Lokshin, 2000).2 One possible explanation of the positive effect is the 
presence of altruistic feelings towards other members with which the individual 
interacts in, e.g., the local community. Another explanation is that the income of other 
people acts like a signal-effect (or a “demonstration effect” or “tunnel effect” as 
coined by Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973) for the individual’s own income potential 
and prospects, thus resulting in positive feelings (Senik, 2005). 
By investigating the effect of the remittances received by the people in the reference 
group (relative remittances) on individuals’ SWB, we build upon and bring together 
the literature strands on relative concerns and remittances. The remittances literature 
focuses mainly on the absolute effect of remittances on well-being, particularly in 
relation to income inequality and poverty (see e.g., Acosta et al., 2008; Akay et al., 
2013). Remittances are expected to be positively associated with the well-being of 
individuals left behind since they represent an additional (or substitutive) income 
source. In addition, however, remittances may change the income distribution and the 
relative income position of households within the sending village. That is, remittances 
might change the reference group’s income position, thereby triggering a “status” or a 
“signal” effect to the extent that individuals might also be concerned with the 
remittances that other households receive.  
Our analysis, based on the Rural to Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) dataset, 
provides novel and striking results on rural households’ relative concerns with respect 
to both rural income and remittances. The first result is that the definition of income 
matters when identifying relative concerns in a regression framework. A measure of 
the overall household income alone might not be able to identify the true effect. 
Second, we show that while a status-effect among rural households exists, the 
magnitude and significance of such an effect depends on the model specification. 
Third, by decomposing the overall household income into the part pertaining to 
remittances and the part pertaining to activities carried out in the village (henceforth: 
                                                 
2 See also the comprehensive survey by Clark and Senik (2010). 
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rural income), we find that rural households experience both status and signal effects 
at the same time. In particular, households exhibit a strong status-effect with respect 
to rural income and an equally strong signal-effect with respect to remittances. This 
result suggests that these two effects may be neglected when analyzing relative 
concerns using aggregate income measures. Fourth, results are very stable across 
heterogeneous groups and overall insensitive to the definition of the reference group. 
Last but not least, we take into account the role of selectivity into migration by both 
estimating Heckman-type regression equations and calculating the counterfactual 
income and expenditures distributions pertaining to migrants.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides information about the data and 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 outlines the econometric approach. Section 4 and 5 
report the results from our baseline and additional models, respectively. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1. The RUMiC Dataset 
We employ data from the Longitudinal Survey on Rural to Urban Migration in China 
(RUMiC), which consists of three distinct surveys: the Urban Household Survey 
(UHS), the Rural Household Survey (RHS), and the Migrant Household Survey 
(MHS).3 Our paper is based on the first wave of the RHS. Data were collected at the 
beginning of 2008, with most information (e.g. migration, income) referring to 2007.4 
The RHS covers the nine largest migrant sending provinces of China.5 The survey 
was conducted using random samples from the household income and expenditure 
surveys carried out in rural villages by the China National Bureau of Statistics, thus 
constituting a representative sample for these provinces.  
The dataset has rich information about demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of household members, including questions on physical and mental 
                                                 
3 For an extensive description of RUMiC, see Akgüc et al. (2014). 
4 The global economic crisis has affected both migration and return decisions. At the end of 2008, 
around 23 million migrants returned to their rural villages (National Bureau of Statistics of China 
2010). Hence, the data used in our paper refer to a time period before the crisis. However, we have also 
checked the robustness of our results by using the waves collected in 2009 and 2010 (estimates 
available upon request. 
5 These are: Anhui, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Sichuan and Zhejiang. 
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health, life events, and social networks. We supplement the main dataset with two 
ancillary modules collected parallel to RUMiC: the income-expenditure household 
module, which contains information on consumption, assets, and expenditure at the 
household level, and the rural community survey, which includes village-level 
information such as economic conditions, migration in and out of the village, and 
public expenditure. A village cadre is usually interviewed about these. Below we 
describe in detail the key variables used in the analysis. Appendix A reports summary 
statistics of all selected variables. 
2.2. Measures of Well-being 
The literature has identified several measures to proxy SWB (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; 
Dolan et al., 2008). These are generally based on survey questions about “happiness,” 
“life-satisfaction,” or “mental health.” In order to measure SWB, we constructed an 
index based on the 12 mental health questions contained in the RUMiC’s General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12).6 The literature has widely employed the GHQ-12 
index (see e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1994, 2002; Akay et al., 2012, 2013). Each 
question allows responses with scores between 0 (high levels) and 3 (low levels). To 
obtain the GHQ-12 index, we sum the scores of the 12 questions, obtaining an index 
ranging from 0 to 36 and then we reverse the scale so that low levels indicate low 
SWB and high levels correspond to high SWB. We also constructed a “happiness” 
index by using the question “How happy are you when you consider each aspect of 
your life?” contained in the GHQ-12 questionnaire. We use this index to test the 
robustness of the results.  
The distribution of our index resembles that of other SWB studies (see, e.g., 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). The distribution of the index is left-skewed, 
with few people reporting very low levels of SWB. In Figure 1, we split the 
distribution into households who receive remittances and those who do not. The 
figure suggests no systematic difference in terms of SWB between the two groups. 
                                                 
6 Our well-being index is based on summing each question in the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-
12). See Appendix B for the details of GHQ-12 questionnaire and Goldberg (1978) for an introduction 
to the questions and use of the GHQ. However, as discussed in Hankins (2008), this approach might  
be problematic if the variances of the individual responses are different, in particular between 
positively and negatively phrased questions. Fortunately, we do not find significant differences in our 
sample.  
6 
 
Figure 1 (a and b) about here 
 
2.3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of individuals aged between 16 and 70 who report SWB 
information. We cover a total of 11,624 individuals across 6,063 households.  
Migrants. One of the key variables is individuals’ migration status. This is 
constructed using the question, “How many months did you live away from the local 
township in 2007?” combined with an ancillary question on where the person lived 
during his or her absence (“If you lived outside the local township for more than three 
months in 2007, where did you live mainly?”). A migrant is defined as someone who 
lived in urban areas for at least six months during 2007. A household might have 
more than one migrant and the migrant can be the head, spouse, or another household 
member. Given this definition, our data show that 39% of households have at least 
one migrant. Note that although the SWB information is missing for individuals who 
currently live in the city, the survey respondent reports all socio-demographic and 
economic information for absent household members. We also construct an indicator 
for whether individuals have migrated in the past (i.e., before 2007).  
Rural Income and Remittances. The other two key variables for this study are the 
components of the overall income of households: rural income and the remittances 
sent by migrants who live in the city. The rural income pertains to a mix of different 
activities carried out in the village including wage employment, self-employment, and 
farming. We have detailed information about the various sources of income, which 
we use in the analysis. Remittances are proxied by a variable capturing the income 
from working in activities conducted outside the village. Income and remittances are 
measured at the household level in thousands of Chinese Yuan (CNY). While we 
explore different definitions, our preferred measures for income and remittances are 
expressed in logarithm and are calculated in per capita terms using the modified 
equivalence scale suggested by the OECD.7  
                                                 
7 To calculate the per capita income and remittances, we divide the levels by the weighted number of 
family members left behind, i.e. excluding migrants. The weights used to calculate equivalent income 
is 1 for the household head, 0.5 for each adult, 0.3 for children.  
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Key statistics. In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics of SWB, along with various 
definitions of income and remittances (see Appendix A for the statistics of additional 
variables). In addition to showing the statistics for the whole sample, we also split the 
list into households who receive and do not receive remittances. The average SWB 
level is 28.08. The difference between remittance receivers and non-receivers is very 
small, albeit statistically significant (28.27 versus 27.86, p-value=0.000). The mean 
level of remittances among receivers is 8,471 CNY. For these households, remittances 
constitute more than one third of the household income. Households with remittances 
report an overall income of 24,990 CYN (found by summing rural income and 
remittances), which is lower than that of households without remittances (26,784 
CYN). However, the income difference between these two groups is not comparable 
since the household (and the labor force) sizes differ systematically due to absent 
members who migrated. If we compare per capita figures, which account for current 
household size, we note that the total incomes of these two groups are rather similar: 
18,049 CYN for households without remittances versus 18,244 CYN (6,264 + 
11,980) for households with remittances.   
Table 1 about here 
3. Econometric Approach 
3.1. Model Specification   
We estimate a series of alternative SWB regressions. In addition to income level and 
other characteristics, the standard approach in the literature identifies relative 
concerns through using the average income of individuals in the reference group as a 
control variable (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Akay et al., 2012, 2013). Similarly, 
our regressions include the reference group’s average income, but we decompose it 
into average rural income and average remittances. Hence, our specification includes 
measures for absolute (𝑌𝑖) and relative income (𝑌𝑖𝑟) and absolute (𝑅𝑖) and relative 
remittances (𝑅𝑖𝑟), where r is the reference group. Accordingly, the baseline model 
reads as follows: 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝛼1 log(𝑌𝑖) + 𝜌1 log(𝑌𝑖𝑟) + 𝛼2 log(𝑅𝑖) + 𝜌2 log(𝑅𝑖𝑟) + 𝑥′𝛽 + 𝜂𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
  
In equation (1) the dependent variable SWB is considered to be latent for each 
individual i, suggesting that an appropriate model would be an ordered probit. 
However, previous studies show no appreciable difference between estimating SWB 
models with linear or latent dependent variable specification (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters, 2004). Hence, in line with the bulk of the SWB literature, we estimate our 
models using OLS and only check the sensitivity of the results using ordered probit at 
the end. The estimates of parameters 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are expected to be non-negative since 
higher levels of income and remittances imply more consumption possibilities and 
possibly higher SWB. However, the “marginal utility” of income and remittances 
might differ. We carry out extensive sensitivity checks surrounding the estimation of 
𝛼1 and 𝛼2 . 
The key parameters to our analysis are 𝜌1 and 𝜌2, which capture the relative income 
and relative remittance effects, respectively. The corresponding variables are defined 
as follows: 
𝑌𝑗
𝑟 = 1
𝑁𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑠
𝑁𝑗
1       
(2) 
𝑅𝑗
𝑟 = 1
𝑁𝑗
∑ 𝑅𝑠
𝑁𝑗
1       
(3) 
where 𝑁𝑗 is the number of individuals within the reference group j (e.g. a county). The 
signs of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 are not obvious a priori. Finding that both income and remittances 
of the reference group are negatively correlated with SWB could reflect the presence 
of envy or jealousy. As described in the introduction, we refer to this situation as the 
status-effect with respect to both income and remittances. On the contrary, both 
estimates could be positive, in which case we find a signal-effect with respect to both 
income and remittances reflecting individual’s own income potential and prospects. 
Indeed, the relative income and remittances could have different signs, implying a 
status-effect for one variable and a signal-effect for the other. Equation (1) also 
includes controls for socio-demographic characteristics (𝑥 ) such as age, sex, and 
marital and health status; the term 𝜂 refers to indicators for provinces. The standard 
errors are clustered at the household level, though the analysis explores other 
clustering criteria as well.    
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3.2. Measuring Reference Groups 
One of the crucial issues is how to define the reference group. While reference groups 
are usually unknown, the literature suggests two distinct approaches to identify 
groups to which individuals compare their income. The first method is to use ad-hoc 
criteria to define the groups based on socio-demographic similarities (e.g., Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005). The second 
method directly asks people to whom they compare their income. The difference 
between these two approaches has been found to be minimal (Clark and Senik, 2010).  
In a survey among rural households in China, Knight et al. (2009) explicitly ask rural 
households about their reference groups. About 70% of the respondents report that 
they compare their income with that of village members. Our dataset includes an 
identifier for the village where the household is located. Thus it would be optimal to 
use village residents as the reference group. However, the sample size is not large 
enough to construct an income variable that is precise enough.8 Instead, we refer to a 
slightly larger orbit of comparison and use Chinese “counties.” Counties are the 
administrative level above villages and below provinces. In our data, there are a total 
of 82 counties (see Figure 2).  
While the county identifies the baseline reference group, we also define narrower 
reference groups by combining additional dimensions of comparison, such as 
similarity in household migration characteristics (i.e., the reference group is 
households within the same county that have migrants) or similarity in employment 
status (i.e., the reference group is wage workers within the same county). In our 
analysis we show how the results are sensitive to the definition of the reference group. 
4. Results 
We present our results as follows. As a preliminary step, we show SWB determinants 
in rural China. Second, we outline results for relative concerns with respect to overall 
household income. Third, we disentangle the components of overall income in order 
to study the role of relative remittances. Fourth, we investigate the role of income 
inequality and observed heterogeneity, and check the sensitivity of results to 
                                                 
8 On average, 10 households are sampled in each village.  
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alternative reference groups. We reserve the next section of the analysis for migration 
selectivity and additional robustness checks.  
4.1. Determinants of Subjective Well-Being in Rural China  
In Table 2 we present the results of a standard OLS regression of SWB, where we 
include individual socio-demographic and economic controls as well as variables 
related to the household, including household members’ migration status. The scope 
of this regression is to show how our results compare with those of existing SWB 
studies. We present results for the whole sample as well as separately for households 
receiving and not receiving remittances. The signs, magnitudes, and statistical 
significance of the estimates pertaining to socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics align with other studies (e.g., Dolan et al., 2008; Knight et al., 2009; 
Akay et al., 2012). The pattern of results is also similar across households who 
receive remittances and those who do not, albeit there are differences in the 
magnitude and sometimes the sign of some estimated parameters. Below, we briefly 
discuss and interpret the benchmark results.  
Rural Income and Remittances. In the first panel of Table 2, we include the two 
components of household income (rural income and remittances), indicators for 
economic activity, and other wealth measures. As one would expect, rural income is 
positively correlated with SWB. The magnitude of this correlation is similar across 
specifications and is usually statistically significant, with the exception of the 
specification related to household members in the remittance-receiving group. Such 
positive correlation is consistent with the results for developed countries (e.g., Dolan 
et al., 2008) and also with previous evidence from China (Knight et al., 2009; Knight 
and Gunatilaka, 2010; Akay et al., 2012).   
While we investigate the role of remittances thoroughly later on, at this point we note 
that remittances positively correlate with SWB, with estimates that are statistically 
significant in all specifications. Furthermore, the magnitude of the “marginal utility of 
remittances” is close to the “marginal utility of rural income”. In fact, the difference 
between the two estimates is not statistically significant (0.210 versus 0.175, p-
value=0.7 for the whole sample).  
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Our regressions include additional economic and wealth-related variables. For 
example, being a salaried worker, a farmer, or self-employed is associated with higher 
well-being than the reference category (which is the group formed by the inactive 
population and those who do household work). However, such an effect is 
economically and statistically larger only for households not receiving remittances. 
Furthermore, working more hours leads to lower utility, particularly for households 
without remittances (see Pouwels et al., 2008). Conditional on other wealth and 
income measures, land size is negatively correlated with SWB, with a larger effect 
found among remittance-receiving households. One possible interpretation is that 
individuals in this group need additional labor in order to maintain the land and carry 
out agricultural activities after the migrant has left. Finally, and perhaps as expected, 
both house size and house value are positively correlated with SWB, with a stronger 
effect for house size. 
Socio-demographic Characteristics. The estimates for age and age-squared suggest 
the existence of a U-shaped relationship, which very much aligns with international 
evidence (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008). Since the sample of left-behind 
individuals is relatively “old” (the average age is 48), the minimum point of the age 
effect is located between 55 and 60. Males report higher SWB compared to females, 
although it is important to point out that the group of left-behind males is highly self-
selected. In line with other studies, we observe a SWB “premium” for marriage (e.g., 
Helliwell, 2003). Health is a strong predictor of SWB. Individuals experience lower 
SWB as their health worsens (the omitted category is “very good health”). We control 
for two additional health-related determinants: height and weight. Weight appears to 
be positively correlated with SWB, while height seems to be unrelated to it. Education 
is another strong predictor of SWB, once again aligned with other studies (e.g., 
Helliwell, 2003). The few households holding urban hukou (6.23% of the total) 
experience higher SWB, though the effect is found only among those who receive 
remittances. While household size is strongly associated with SWB, we found only a 
weak relationship with the number of children, in line with the reported findings in 
Dolan et al. (2008).  
Migration Characteristics. We control for a rich set of variables capturing the 
households’ migration characteristics. First, we include dummy variables to capture 
12 
 
the number of migrants in the households (the base category is “no migrants”). In 
general, having one or more migrants in the household is negatively associated with 
SWB. The negative sign is compatible with a migrant’s absence having larger costs 
than benefits in terms of well-being. Recent literature has shown that the absence of 
household members due to migration can have both positive and negative effects on 
well-being determinants, such as education and self-employment. For example, 
Biavaschi et al. (2015) found that being left-behind triggers a stronger influence of 
older siblings on the schooling performance of the youngest. On the other hand, 
Giulietti et al. (2013) found that left-behind individuals are less likely to be self-
employed when compared to return migrants and individuals who live in non-migrant 
households. Since these factors are already controlled for in the regression, we 
interpret the negative estimate as the psychological cost associated with the migrant’s 
absence (albeit often temporary). Since there are no appreciable differences between 
whether the migrant is the household head or the spouse, the migration effect’s size 
and magnitude does not seem to depend on which family member has migrated.  
Table 2 about here 
4.2. Relative Concerns in Rural China 
To go one step further, we investigate relative concerns with respect to total 
household income and report the results in Table 3. For conciseness, we report only 
the absolute and relative income estimates. Bear in mind that the specifications 
include the same explanatory variables as in Table 2, except for the addition of the 
reference group’s average income. In the first three columns we check the role of 
relative concerns by holding the reference group (the local county) constant and check 
the effect of functional form and measure of income used.  
When we use a definition of income in level (first column) or in per capita terms 
(second column), the relative concerns parameter estimate is economically and 
statistically insignificant. In contrast, when we use our preferred definition (log per 
capita income) the estimate for relative income is large, negative, and statistically 
significant. While we are confident about the choice of our definition, as many SWB 
studies have adopted it before (see e.g. the comprehensive review by Dolan et al., 
2008), we note that such a result is rather puzzling.  
13 
 
Table 3 about here 
Reference Groups. In the remaining columns in Table 3, we explore different 
reference groups that are alternative to the one “all other people in the same county.” 
In this exercise, we hold the definition of income (log per capita) constant. We first 
narrow down the reference group to “all other people in the same village.” In this 
case, it should be noted that a smaller number of individuals is used to calculate the 
average per capita income (there are on average 10 households per village, resulting 
in just about 30 non-migrant individuals per village: a minimum of 13 and a 
maximum of 61). Despite this, results are similar to the baseline, in which we used a 
larger number of individuals (on average 97 households and 315 individuals) to 
calculate the reference group’s income.9  
When we refine the reference group to all other people in the same county with and 
without wage employment separately, we once again find estimates that are 
comparable to the baseline reference group. Finally, we obtain very similar results 
when we look separately at all other people in the same county who are below and 
above 40 years old. These results suggest that the relative income effect is not 
particularly sensitive to more precise definitions of the reference group.    
4.3. Remittances and Relative Concerns 
Baseline Results. We now decompose the overall household income into income 
generated by the activities of people left behind (rural income) and the remittances 
sent by migrants. Using these two components, we estimate the full model 
specification presented in equation (1). We are mainly interested in absolute and 
relative income ( and ) and absolute and relative remittances ( and ). Table 
4 presents the results.   
Similarly to the results in Table 3, household (rural) income is positive and significant 
across all model specifications. Likewise, the relative (rural) income is statistically 
significant, with a large negative magnitude (-0.852).10 Both absolute and relative 
                                                 
9 Note that income and remittance variation is at the household level. This is why 10 households per 
village do not provide enough variation.  
10 One important remark is that when we include remittances in the regression, relative concerns are not 
sensitive to the definition of income. We have estimated alternative models using per capita income 
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remittances are positive, but only the latter is statistically significant, with a large 
estimate (0.865). Our baseline results imply that rural individuals experience a 
substantial status-effect with respect to income and an equally large signal-effect with 
respect to remittances. The result is very similar when we narrow the sample to 
include only household heads.   
Who is affected? Relative concerns with respect to remittances might be different 
among households who receive the remittances (around 48% of the sample) and those 
who do not. In the third and fourth column of Table 4, we analyze the results 
separately for the two groups. The household income is positive for both groups, 
albeit stronger for households without remittances. Interestingly, the relative concerns 
with respect to income are present only among households not receiving remittances. 
These results are consistent with the fact that the main source of income for 
households without remittances is rural income, while the other group also relies on 
money sent by migrants. Remittances are found to be positively related to SWB 
among remittance-receiving households, yet the effect is not precisely estimated. On 
the contrary, relative remittances positively influence both households’ SWB, 
although the effect is almost twice as large for households receiving remittances.  
Reference Groups. We explore the sensitivity of relative remittances to the definition 
of the reference group. To do so, we keep the county as the regional orbit and add 
some additional criteria. The first two alternative reference groups involve similarity 
in age and wage employment status. We find very similar results to those in the first 
column. In the last column, we recognize that not all households with migrants 
receive remittances. We explore what happens if we calculate relative income and 
remittances among households with and without migrants. The results are slightly 
different than those in the first column, yet the pattern is the same. In particular, the 
signal-effect of relative remittances is stronger while the status-effect of relative 
income is weaker.   
Does income inequality explain the results? Due to their substantial size, remittances 
are expected to affect the income distribution within the receiving regions. The 
empirical evidence, mostly based on international migration, suggests that remittances 
                                                                                                                                           
without log transformation, finding results remarkably similar to those obtained with using our 
preferred definition of income. 
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either increase or decrease income inequality (Acosta et al., 2008). Moreover, income 
inequality might have a distinct effect on SWB, but this could be “confounded” by the 
relative income effect (see on this point, e.g., Senik, 2008). In order to further control 
for the additional effect of income inequality on SWB, we control for the GINI index 
calculated within the reference group. In particular, we calculate income inequality in 
the county using both the pre- and post-remittances per capita household income. This 
allows us to assess the remittances’ contribution to income inequality in the region. 
Interestingly, we find that remittances are associated with lower or higher income 
inequality depending on the county. Around 46% of the counties exhibit higher 
income inequality after receiving remittances.  
Results in the last column in Table 4 show that accounting for differential income 
inequality before and after remittances does not affect our baseline results. The sign 
of the correlation is negative—implying that increases in inequality due to remittances 
reduce SWB—but is statistically insignificant. 11  As expected, the strength of the 
signal from the remittances in the reference group is slightly reduced; yet compared to 
the baseline, the reduction is not statistically significant.  
Table 4 about here 
4.4. Heterogeneity 
Our sample comprises heterogeneous groups with respect to economic activity, 
migration status, and other characteristics. We therefore investigate how our main 
results differ across various groups through a simple modification of the baseline 
econometric model. We first define a dummy variable indicating a specific individual 
characteristic, D, and then we interact D and (1 - D) with the absolute and relative 
income and remittance variables. We outline the modified econometric specification 
below. In Table 5 we only present the estimates of 𝛼21,𝛼20, 𝜌21 and 𝜌20. 
 
                                                 
11  While here we focus on the “change” of income inequality to identify which part is due to 
remittances, an important issue is the effect of the inequality “level” on SWB. In unreported results, we 
estimate two SWB regressions that include the inequality “before” and “after” remittances. Similarly to 
other studies, we find that income inequality is positively correlated with SWB (Senik, 2008; Kingdon 
and Knight 2007; Knight et al, 2009). While one might expect income inequality to affect utility 
negatively, inequality could also capture rural households’ income possibilities, therefore positively 
correlating with SWB.   
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝛼1 log(𝑌𝑖) + 𝜌1 log(𝑌𝑖𝑟) + 𝛼21 log(𝑅𝑖) ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼20 log(𝑅𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑖)  
 +𝜌21 log(𝑅𝑖𝑟) ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜌20 log(𝑅𝑖𝑟) ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑖) + 𝑥′𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜂𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖   (3) 
Economic Characteristics and Income Distribution. A large part of households have 
members who are in wage employment. Wage employment could influence both the 
role of absolute and relative remittances. We investigate this aspect in the first two 
columns in Table 5. The first remarkable aspect is that wage earners exhibit a 
negative correlation with remittances sent by other household members. This suggests 
a sort of dissatisfaction or envy effect, although the effect is small (-0.099) and 
statistically insignificant. The opposite effect—slightly larger (0.124) but statistically 
significant—is found among individuals who are not wage earners. One possible 
explanation is that since wage earners are individuals who are likely to migrate in the 
near future, they tend to compare their income with that of migrants in the local 
region (using remittances as a proxy for the urban wage) and this generates a status-
effect. Furthermore, we find that the remittance signal-effect is smaller for wage 
workers than for other individuals (0.647 vs. 0.901).  
Next, we compare farmers with other individuals in the third and fourth columns. 
Interestingly, the income status-effect and the remittance signal-effect are larger in 
terms of absolute magnitude for this group. In the fifth and sixth columns we compare 
individuals living in counties where the share of wage workers is above the median of 
all counties versus those living in the remaining counties. In areas where wage 
workers are overrepresented, the income status-effect is relatively stronger and the 
remittance signal-effect is relatively weaker, aligning with the results in the first two 
columns.  
The second set of results focuses on the reference groups’ income distribution and 
results can be found in columns five and six. We hypothesize that relative concerns 
with respect to income and/or remittances might be different depending on the 
regional income level. We hence generate an indicator for counties with income 
above the median of all counties. Interestingly we find that the relative income status-
effect is much stronger for relatively richer counties, and in fact, it is close to zero for 
relatively poorer counties. It seems that a higher economic level in the region relates 
to a higher relative concerns (Clark et al., 2008). On the contrary, the signal-effect 
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from remittances is weaker in relatively richer counties. 
We then investigate in columns seven and eight the role of income inequality by 
interacting our key variables with an indicator for counties where remittance flows 
reduced the inequality from rural incomes. We find a lower status-effect with respect 
to income in regions where income inequality is decreased. The signs and magnitudes 
of other estimates are very similar to the baseline model, implying once more that 
income inequality does not play a major role in explaining our results.   
Migration Experience and Intensity. Individuals’ migration status might also affect 
both the status- and the signal-effect. We investigate how our results differ depending 
on an individual’s migration experience as well as on the migration “intensity” within 
the reference group. We report the results in the lower panel of Table 5. The results 
are striking: in column one we find that only individuals in households without 
migrants experience the status-effect with respect to income while the signal-effect is 
very strong and statistically significant for individuals from households with at least 
one migrant.  
We further create an indicator for counties with a number of migrants above the 
median. We consistently find that the relative income effect is only significant in 
counties where households have fewer migrants, and they hence rely more on the 
income earned with activities in rural areas. On the contrary, the relative remittance 
effect is much stronger in counties with relatively more migrants (the third and fourth 
columns). In the fifth and sixth columns we explore the results depending on whether 
the individual migrated in the past or not. The results between the two groups 
resemble each other, indicating that previous migration experience does not bear 
consequences on the current status- or signal-effect.   
Table 5 about here 
Individual Heterogeneity. In the last columns we explore the heterogeneity of the 
results through select socio-demographic characteristics. In the seventh and eighth 
columns in the lower panel of Table 5 we distinguish between individuals who are 
above and below 40 years old. We find a much stronger status-effect from relative 
income among the young and a much stronger signal-effect from relative remittances 
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among the older. This suggests stronger “income competition” among the young. 
Furthermore, it is important to remind the reader that in the context of rural China, 
remittances are often sent to support elderly parents; this could explain the 
discrepancies in the signal-effect from remittances. On the contrary, education does 
not seem to play a strong role when we distinguish between individuals who have 
education above or below the median (the threshold is eight years of education).  
5. Robustness and Self-Selection  
In this section we first investigate the robustness of our results with some additional 
tests. We then explore the potential confounding role of selectivity into migration. 
Finally, we present a counterfactual analysis accounting for the absent migrant’s 
income and expenditures.  
5.1. Further Robustness Checks 
Additional Controls and Clustering. We investigate the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to alternative specifications and measures. In unreported results, we first look 
at the role of control variables. We compare specifications where we progressively 
add control variables into equation (1). Results are remarkably robust with respect to 
specifications with few or more control variables. We note the important role of 
geographic indicators in the regressions to capture regional differences such as prices. 
In our baseline, we use province fixed-effects. In the models in which we define the 
reference group with criteria narrower than the county, we also introduce county 
fixed-effects and find essentially similar results. Additionally, we experiment what 
happens when we cluster standard errors at the county level instead of the household 
level. As one would expect, the standard errors become somewhat larger but the 
statistical significance of our key results is only partially affected.12 
Estimators and Reference Income. Throughout the paper we use a linear model as our 
preferred specification, also due to the fact that ordered probit models do not allow for 
easy ceteris paribus interpretation of the parameter estimates. For robustness, we re-
estimate the baseline using ordered probit. The first column in Table 6 presents the 
results. The key parameters’ signs and significance are very much in line with our 
                                                 
12 Results are available upon request.   
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baseline OLS. In the second column, we use median instead of average income and 
remittances, as the median is more robust to extreme values within reference groups. 
However, this particular measurement does not seem to affect our results.   
Unobserved Heterogeneity. Our approach and data do not allow us to control for the 
time-invariant unobserved individual effects (e.g., genetic predisposition, personality 
characteristics). These characteristics are found to be very important in explaining 
individuals’ SWB (Boyce and Wood, 2011). In this robustness check, we follow the 
strategy developed in Akay et al. (2012) to partially control for these latent 
characteristics. The authors suggest using GHQ-11 instead of GHQ-12 as a response 
variable and to use the twelfth question (“How happy are you when you consider each 
aspect of your life?”) as a control variable to proxy for time-invariant individual 
characteristics. The results in the third column in Table 6 suggest only minor changes 
with respect to our baseline.  
5.2. Selective Migration  
There are different potential sources of self-selection that might affect our result. One 
of the most important relates to whether people’s intrinsic preferences towards status 
generate a strong incentive to migrate. Stark and Yitzhaki (1988) and Stark (2006) 
discuss the fact that the desire for income status may be one of the reasons individuals 
decide to migrate. Using a household panel survey from two provinces in rural China, 
Wu (2008) finds evidence supporting this argument. The paper reports that lower 
income positions increase the chance that some household member migrates. We 
tackle this question by using a Heckman-type selection specification to model the 
migration decision.  
One of the features of our sample is that we have socio-demographic characteristics 
(except the SWB information) for individuals who are currently migrants in the urban 
areas. This allows us to specify a selection model as follows. The individual decides 
to stay or migrate as a function of absolute and relative income and remittances, plus 
a set of other determinants included in 𝑧𝑖: 
𝑠𝑖 = 1(𝛼1𝑠 log(𝑌𝑖) + 𝜌1𝑠 log(𝑌𝑖𝑟) + 𝛼2𝑠 log(𝑅𝑖) + 𝜌2𝑠 log(𝑅𝑖𝑟) + 𝑧′𝛾 + 𝑤𝑖 > 0),        (4) 
where 𝒔𝒊 is an indicator taking the value 1 if the individual is a migrant (which in our 
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data corresponds to whether the SWB of individual i is observed). 𝜶𝟏𝒔 ,𝝆𝟏𝒔 ,𝜶𝟐𝒔 ,𝝆𝟐𝒔  and 
𝜸 are the first-stage parameters to be estimated. 𝒘𝒊 is the error term of the sample 
selection equation assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and unit 
variance. In the second stage we estimate the SWB equation conditional on selection. 
The selection corrected SWB equations are defined as follows: 
𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒊
∗ = 𝟏(𝜶𝟏𝒕 𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝒀𝒊) + 𝝆𝟏𝒕 𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝒀𝒊𝒓) + 𝜶𝟐𝒕 𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝑹𝒊) + 𝝆𝟐𝒕 𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝑹𝒊𝒓) + 𝒙′𝝀 + 𝒖𝒊 > 𝟎,    
(5) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖∗ × 𝑠𝑖.                                                                                                   (6) 
Equation (5) is the target SWB equation and our aim is to estimate the selection 
corrected absolute and relative income and remittances, given with parameters 
𝛼1
𝑡 ,𝜌1𝑡 ,𝛼2𝑡 , and 𝜌2𝑡 . We estimate the equation (4) and (5–6) simultaneously. In this 
model, the error terms are specified as 𝑢𝑖~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑢2), 𝑤𝑖~𝑁(0,1), and the correlation 
between equations is 𝜌𝑢𝑢 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑢𝑖,𝑤𝑖). 
Identification requires at least one exclusion restriction, which will be used in the 
selection equation and excluded from the main equation. This implies that we need to 
seek a variable that affects SWB only through migration, but not directly. We have 
various instrumental variables that we can exploit. Our favorite instrument is based on 
the distance of the village from: (i) the nearest government building, and (ii) the 
nearest port or station. Distance is categorized in a variable with five values, ranging 
from the shortest to longest. By combining the two distance variables, we can 
introduce 10 dummy variables in the selection equation. The other instrument is the 
birth order of the individual. Villages close to government buildings or stations are 
those where individuals are more likely to migrate out. Similarly, first-born are less 
likely to migrate—since they often are responsible for taking care of the family. 
Hence both instruments are thought to influence migration without having a direct 
effect on SWB. 
One important remark is that results from the selection equation suggest that relative 
income and remittances are positively correlated with the migration decision, 
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supporting the findings of Stark (2006) and Wu (2008).13 The correlation between 
equations is significant (between -0.10 and -0.15, depending on the instruments used). 
Our main interest is on the corrected estimates of absolute and relative income and 
remittances (𝜶𝟏𝒕 ,𝝆𝟏𝒕 ,𝜶𝟐𝒕 , 𝐚𝐚𝐚 𝝆𝟐𝒕 ). The estimates presented in the fourth and fifth 
columns in Table 6 are very similar to those in Table 4, suggesting that our main 
results are robust to self-selection into migration.14  
5.3. Counterfactual Income and Net Remittances 
The income level of households with migrants is expected to be comparatively lower 
than that of households without migrants, since the former does not account for the 
absent migrants’ income. The migrants’ only contribution to the household income is 
remittances. Failure to account for the potential income contribution of absent 
migrants might lead to miscalculating absolute or relative income and remittances. In 
this section, we simulate migrants’ counterfactual income and expenditures in order to 
calculate net remittances, that is, migrants’ net contribution to the household income 
(Barham and Boucher, 1998; Howell, 2014).  To do so, we use the available 
information from the migrant’s rural village and at the same time control for 
migration self-selection.  
The income generating process of an individual within the village is as follows. The 
individual first decides whether to stay or migrate: 
𝒎𝒊 = 𝟏(𝒈𝒊′𝝍 + 𝝋𝒊 > 𝟎) ,                                                                                              
(7) 
where 𝒎𝒊  is the selection indicator for an individual to migrate. 𝒈𝒊 is a vector of 
socio-demographic and economic characteristics affecting migration. As in the 
previous specification, 𝝋𝒊 is the error in the migration equation, assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. We then define the selection-
corrected income equation using log household per capita income as follows: 
𝐥𝐥𝐥 (𝒀𝒊∗) = 𝒙𝒊′𝝁 + 𝒖𝒊,                                                                                                   (8) 
                                                 
13 Although we do not report first stage regression results here, the results align with the literature and 
can be provided upon request. 
14 We have tested additional instruments such as “migration intentions” and “network size in urban 
areas” in combination with distance and birth order. Results essentially reflect those in Table 6.  
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log (𝑌𝑖 ) = log(𝑌𝑖∗) × 𝑚𝑖 .                                                                                          (9) 
Using the conditional expected value of this model, we simulate the counterfactual 
income of the migrants in our sample: 
E[𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖 ,𝑚𝑖 = 1] = 𝑥𝑖′𝜇 + 𝜌𝑢𝑢𝜎𝑢 𝜙(𝑔𝑖′𝜓)Φ(𝑔𝑖′𝜓)                                                                    (10) 
where 𝝓 and 𝚽 are the probability density and distribution function of the standard 
normal random variable. The model is estimated simultaneously using a maximum 
likelihood estimator; 𝝆𝒖𝝋 = 𝑪𝑪𝒓𝒓(𝒖𝒊,𝝋𝒊) is the correlation between the selection and 
income equations. Predicted values from equation (10) provide an estimate of what 
the migrant’s income would have been had he or she not migrated. We use the 
identical procedure to obtain the counterfactual expenditures of migrants. In modeling 
migration we use the same instruments as above, i.e., distance and birth order. To 
obtain the net remittances, we subtract the difference between the counterfactual 
income and counterfactual expenditure from the actual remittances. The distribution 
of net remittances is similar to that of actual remittances, yet a significant portion of 
net remittances is negative since some migrants contribute more to the household 
income in the counterfactual situation, i.e., had they not migrated.  
As a last step, we calculate the mean net rural income and net remittances within the 
reference group and use this to estimate the baseline model specification in equation 
(5). The last column in Table 6 reports the results. Since there are several negative 
values in the net remittances, in this model we use values in level and not in log—
hence magnitudes are not directly comparable with the other models in the table. 
However, the pattern of the estimates remarkably aligns with the baseline, as we find 
a negative relative income effect and a positive relative remittances effect.  
Table 6 about here 
6. Conclusions 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper investigating the effect of 
remittances on households’ relative concerns. Using the Rural to Urban Migration in 
China survey, we employ a subjective well-being approach on a sample of individuals 
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living in major migrant sending provinces. Our main result suggests that relative 
concerns matter among rural individuals and households. In particular, the relative 
income effect is negative, implying a status-effect, while the relative remittances 
effect is positive, implying a signal-effect. The absolute magnitudes of the two effects 
are very similar. These results are robust with respect to the reference group 
definition, the measure of relative concerns, and several self-selection issues.   
Our study has two major implications. First, we provide a potential explanation of 
why relative concerns with respect to income are found to be weak or negligible in 
some developing countries. We show that the effect of overall income depends on its 
components: the part accruing to remittances and the part rural activities generate. 
Failing to disentangle these aspects would confound the status- and signal-effects. 
Second, policy aiming to improve rural households’ well-being (e.g., redistributive 
interventions) should take into account the potential contrasting outcomes in terms of 
relative concerns with respect to rural income and remittances. 
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Appendix  
Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
  Whole Sample   Households without Remittances   Households with Remittances 
  All HH Head   All HH Head   All HH Head 
  Mean SD. Mean SD.   Mean SD. Mean SD.   Mean SD. Mean SD. 
Subjective Well-Being (GHQ 12)  28.081 (5.179) 28.648 (4.891)   28.267 (5.112) 28.838 (4.789)   27.856 (5.251) 28.412 (5.006) 
Age  48.106 (11.029) 50.874 (9.235)   47.494 (11.467) 50.301 (9.807)   48.845 (10.431) 51.585 (8.421) 
Male 0.557 (0.497) 0.954 (0.209)   0.573 (0.495) 0.961 (0.193)   0.538 (0.499) 0.945 (0.227) 
Married 0.934 (0.249) 0.954 (0.210)   0.924 (0.265) 0.952 (0.214)   0.946 (0.227) 0.956 (0.205) 
Good Health 0.491 (0.500) 0.497 (0.500)   0.495 (0.500) 0.499 (0.500)   0.487 (0.500) 0.494 (0.500) 
Average Health 0.232 (0.422) 0.231 (0.421)   0.220 (0.415) 0.214 (0.410)   0.247 (0.431) 0.251 (0.434) 
Poor Health 0.053 (0.225) 0.045 (0.208)   0.050 (0.218) 0.045 (0.207)   0.057 (0.232) 0.046 (0.210) 
Years of Education 6.742 (3.065) 7.279 (2.629)   6.964 (3.122) 7.442 (2.698)   6.476 (2.974) 7.077 (2.527) 
Urban Hukou 0.060 (0.238) 0.056 (0.230)   0.082 (0.274) 0.077 (0.267)   0.035 (0.183) 0.030 (0.170) 
One Child 0.262 (0.440) 0.247 (0.431)   0.302 (0.459) 0.291 (0.454)   0.215 (0.411) 0.192 (0.394) 
Two Children  0.402 (0.490) 0.423 (0.494)   0.392 (0.488) 0.421 (0.494)   0.415 (0.493) 0.426 (0.495) 
More than Two Children 0.280 (0.449) 0.303 (0.459)   0.243 (0.429) 0.262 (0.440)   0.326 (0.469) 0.353 (0.478) 
Number HH Members 4.060 (1.376) 3.965 (1.393)   3.749 (1.306) 3.629 (1.293)   4.436 (1.363) 4.381 (1.401) 
Relationship to Head: Head 0.522 (0.500) 1.000 (0.000)   0.528 (0.499) 1.000 (0.000)   0.513 (0.500) 1.000 (0.000) 
Relationship to Head: Spouse 0.374 (0.484) 0.000 (0.000)   0.362 (0.481) 0.000 (0.000)   0.389 (0.488) 0.000 (0.000) 
Relationship to Head: Child 0.083 (0.276) 0.000 (0.000)   0.094 (0.292) 0.000 (0.000)   0.070 (0.255) 0.000 (0.000) 
Spouse is a Migrant 0.018 (0.132) 0.023 (0.151)   0.005 (0.073) 0.007 (0.083)   0.032 (0.177) 0.044 (0.205) 
HH Head is a Migrant 0.044 (0.206) 0.000 (0.000)   0.010 (0.101) 0.000 (0.000)   0.086 (0.280) 0.000 (0.000) 
One Child is a Migrant 0.187 (0.390) 0.200 (0.400)   0.136 (0.342) 0.142 (0.349)   0.250 (0.433) 0.272 (0.445) 
Two Children are Migrants 0.158 (0.365) 0.175 (0.380)   0.049 (0.215) 0.057 (0.232)   0.290 (0.454) 0.322 (0.467) 
Other HH Member is Migrant 0.023 (0.150) 0.022 (0.147)   0.011 (0.107) 0.010 (0.100)   0.037 (0.188) 0.037 (0.189) 
Migrated in the Past 0.148 (0.356) 0.181 (0.385)   0.134 (0.341) 0.166 (0.372)   0.166 (0.372) 0.200 (0.400) 
No Migrants in HH 0.612 (0.487) 0.609 (0.488)   0.799 (0.401) 0.793 (0.405)   0.386 (0.487) 0.382 (0.486) 
One Migrant in HH 0.206 (0.405) 0.202 (0.401)   0.145 (0.352) 0.145 (0.352)   0.280 (0.449) 0.272 (0.445) 
Two Migrants in HH 0.126 (0.332) 0.133 (0.339)   0.044 (0.205) 0.049 (0.217)   0.226 (0.418) 0.236 (0.425) 
More than Two Migrants in HH 0.055 (0.229) 0.056 (0.231)   0.012 (0.108) 0.013 (0.112)   0.108 (0.310) 0.110 (0.314) 
Remittances (1000 CNY) 3.823 (7.201) 3.781 (7.258)             8.432 (8.689) 8.471 (8.850) 
Remittances per Capita (1000 CNY) 3.365 (5.220) 3.357 (5.246)             6.217 (6.725) 6.282 (6.799) 
Household Income (1000 CNY) 22.363 (23.895) 22.203 (24.652)   27.370 (29.048) 26.785 (30.170)   16.326 (13.244) 16.519 (13.200) 
Household per C. Income (1000 CNY) 14.962 (15.429) 15.351 (16.520)   17.727 (18.362) 18.050 (19.789)   11.628 (9.914) 12.003 (10.272) 
Wage Employment 0.225 (0.418) 0.247 (0.431)   0.281 (0.449) 0.295 (0.456)   0.158 (0.364) 0.188 (0.391) 
Self-employment 0.072 (0.258) 0.094 (0.291)   0.096 (0.294) 0.120 (0.325)   0.043 (0.203) 0.061 (0.239) 
Observations 11624   6063     6354   3357     5270   2706   
Source: RUMiC 2008. Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Income and remittances are in 1,000 CNY. 
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Appendix B: General Health Questionnaire (GHQ 12) 
1- When you are doing something, do you find that 
(1) Can concentrate; (2) Attention occasionally diverted; (3) Attention sometimes diverted;  
(4) Attention frequently diverted, cannot concentrate 
 
2- Do you often lose sleep over worry? 
(1) Not at all; (2) Occasionally; (3) Fairly often; (4) Very often 
 
3 - Can you play useful part in things? 
(1) Always can; (2) Can play some positive roles; (3) Can play positive roles poorly;  
(4) Cannot play a positive role 
 
4- Are you capable of making decisions? 
(1) Always have own opinions; (2) Sometimes have own opinions; (3) Do not have many 
own opinions; 4) Do not have any personal opinion at all 
 
5- Are you constantly under strain? 
(1) Never; (2) Sometimes; (3) Fairly often; (4) Very often 
 
6- Do you feel you couldn’t overcome difficulties? 
(1) Never; (2) Sometimes; (3) Fairly often; (4) Very often 
7- Are you able to enjoy day-to-day activities? 
(1) Very interesting; (2) Fairly interesting; (3) Not very interesting;  
(4) Not interesting at all 
 
8- Are you able to face problems? 
(1) Never; (2) Seldom; (3) Sometimes; (4) Always 
 
9- Do you feel depressed? 
(1) Not at all; (2) A little bit; (3) Fairly seriously;  
(4) Very seriously 
 
10- Do you always lack confidence? 
(1) Not at all; (2) A little bit; (3) Fairly seriously;  
(4) Very seriously 
 
11- Do you often think that you have no value? 
(1) Not at all; (2) A little bit; (3) Fairly seriously; (4) Very seriously 
 
12- Are you happy when you consider each aspect of your life? 
(1) Very happy; (2) Fairly happy; (3) Not very happy; (4) Not happy at all 
Source: RUMiC 2007. See Goldberg D (1978) for questions and use of the GHQ. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of SWB 
 
             a) Individuals who receive remittances                 b) Individuals who do not receive remittances 
Source: RUMiC 2007. Notes: GHQ-12 index obtained by summing the answers to the GHQ questionnaire. 
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Figure 2. Counties sampled by RUMiC 
 
 Note: The nine countries are Anhui, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Sichuan and Zhejiang. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Whole Sample   Households without Remittances   Households with Remittances 
  All HH Head   All HH Head   All HH Head 
  Mean SD. Mean SD.   Mean SD. Mean SD.   Mean SD. Mean SD. 
Subjective Well-Being (GHQ 12)  28.081 (5.179) 28.648 (4.891)   28.267 (5.112) 28.838 (4.789)   27.856 (5.251) 28.412 (5.006) 
Remittances  3.823 (7.201) 3.781 (7.258)             8.432 (8.689) 8.471 (8.850) 
Remittances per Capita  3.365 (5.22) 3.357 (5.246)             6.217 (6.725) 6.282 (6.799) 
Household Income 22.363 (23.895) 22.203 (24.652)   27.370 (29.048) 26.785 (30.170)   16.326 (13.244) 16.519 (13.200) 
Household per Capita Income  14.962 (15.429) 15.351 (16.520)   17.727 (18.362) 18.050 (19.789)   11.628 (9.914) 12.003 (10.272) 
Observations 11624   6063     6354   3357     5270   2706   
Source: RUMiC 2008. Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Income and remittances are in 1,000 CNY. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Subjective Well-Being in Rural China 
  Whole sample   HH with remittances   HH without remittances 
  All HH head   All HH head   All HH head 
Economic Characteristics                 
Log HH Income per Capita      0.210**       0.256***   0.206      0.293**         0.237**       0.243**  
  (0.084) (0.091)   (0.135) (0.148)   (0.112) (0.119) 
Log Remittances per Capita      0.175**       0.176**         0.198*        0.293**        
  (0.068) (0.076)   (0.111) (0.123)       
Farmer            1.111***      1.011***   0.086 0.523        1.568***      1.147*** 
             (0.270) (0.356)   (0.480) (0.615)   (0.323) (0.426) 
Self-employed (D)      1.129***      1.232***   0.241 0.739        1.502***      1.357*** 
             (0.312) (0.382)   (0.566) (0.661)   (0.371) (0.456) 
Farmer (D)      0.685***      0.618**         0.783***      1.173***        0.553*** 0.186 
             (0.165) (0.269)   (0.265) (0.443)   (0.205) (0.327) 
Hours of Work     -0.008*   -0.007   0.006 0.009       -0.014***     -0.015*** 
             (0.004) (0.005)   (0.008) (0.009)   (0.005) (0.006) 
Land Size (Mu)     -0.022*   -0.023   -0.038     -0.053**    -0.017 -0.011 
             (0.014) (0.015)   (0.023) (0.025)   (0.016) (0.017) 
House Size (m2)      0.507***      0.473***   0.360      0.516**         0.530***      0.410**  
             (0.140) (0.151)   (0.227) (0.253)   (0.177) (0.190) 
House Value (1000 CNY) 0.078 0.125   0.111 0.104   0.102 0.164 
             (0.074) (0.080)   (0.113) (0.124)   (0.097) (0.104) 
Socio-demographic Characteristics                 
Age              -0.118*** -0.009   -0.088 -0.002       -0.131**  -0.008 
             (0.043) (0.062)   (0.069) (0.106)   (0.054) (0.079) 
Age squared      0.001**  0.000   0.001 0.000        0.001**  0.000 
             (0.000) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Male              0.756***      0.901***        0.809***      1.144**         0.734*** 0.670 
             (0.191) (0.325)   (0.286) (0.444)   (0.258) (0.479) 
Married           1.173***      1.538***        1.233***      1.579***        1.148***      1.529*** 
             (0.255) (0.315)   (0.389) (0.474)   (0.331) (0.418) 
Good Health      -2.228***     -2.012***       -2.262***     -2.317***       -2.165***     -1.797*** 
             (0.121) (0.140)   (0.189) (0.221)   (0.158) (0.181) 
Average Health     -3.728***     -3.349***       -3.602***     -3.368***       -3.803***     -3.389*** 
             (0.154) (0.179)   (0.227) (0.263)   (0.211) (0.246) 
Poor Health      -8.143***     -7.216***       -8.052***     -7.374***       -8.174***     -7.043*** 
             (0.316) (0.440)   (0.471) (0.698)   (0.422) (0.553) 
Years of Education      0.166***      0.140***        0.185***      0.131***        0.142***      0.139*** 
             (0.018) (0.024)   (0.028) (0.039)   (0.024) (0.031) 
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Height (cm) 0.014 -0.002   0.020 0.005   0.008 -0.006 
             (0.010) (0.013)   (0.015) (0.020)   (0.013) (0.017) 
Weight (kg)      0.014**       0.019**    0.007 0.008        0.023***      0.029**  
             (0.007) (0.009)   (0.010) (0.013)   (0.009) (0.011) 
Urban Hukou 0.113 0.408        0.841**       1.845***   -0.076 0.001 
             (0.217) (0.250)   (0.395) (0.484)   (0.256) (0.287) 
One Child 0.086      0.665*     0.515 1.036   -0.296 0.358 
             (0.310) (0.388)   (0.533) (0.648)   (0.367) (0.470) 
Two Children 0.181 0.564   0.396 0.686   0.044 0.518 
             (0.315) (0.382)   (0.542) (0.629)   (0.370) (0.466) 
More than Two Children 0.079 0.559   0.515 0.949   -0.297 0.268 
             (0.329) (0.398)   (0.558) (0.652)   (0.391) (0.488) 
# HH Members      0.232***      0.226***        0.307***      0.386***        0.198***      0.147**  
             (0.050) (0.055)   (0.081) (0.089)   (0.068) (0.074) 
Migration Characteristics                 
HH Head Migrant 0.086     0.317     -0.234   
             (0.261)     (0.300)     (0.715)   
Spouse Migrant -0.166 -0.277   -0.033 -0.182   0.237 -0.119 
             (0.414) (0.394)   (0.465) (0.447)   (0.905) (0.879) 
Has Migrated before 2007 -0.076 -0.228   -0.056 -0.300   -0.063 -0.186 
             (0.136) (0.159)   (0.202) (0.250)   (0.187) (0.207) 
One Migrant in HH     -0.644***     -0.711***       -0.928***     -0.887***       -0.561***     -0.660*** 
             (0.144) (0.158)   (0.218) (0.238)   (0.195) (0.219) 
Two Migrants in HH     -0.550***     -0.566***       -0.977***     -0.986***   -0.008 0.035 
             (0.195) (0.213)   (0.259) (0.281)   (0.329) (0.362) 
Three or More Migrants in HH     -1.136***     -1.174***       -1.665***     -1.810***       -1.369**      -1.462**  
  (0.291) (0.331)   (0.372) (0.420)   (0.612) (0.700) 
Constant         24.377***     22.707***       22.072***     20.442***       25.524***     23.798*** 
             (1.872) (2.564)   (3.005) (4.172)   (2.401) (3.284) 
R-squared 0.234 0.191   0.217 0.181   0.260 0.214 
Observations 11624 6063   5270 2706   6354 3357 
Source: RUMiC 2008. Notes: Models estimated using OLS. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
household level are shown in parentheses. (D) indicates dummy variables. The model includes indicators for the 10 provinces (estimates are omitted). Per capita 
income and remittances are calculated using the modified OECD equivalence scale, which uses the following weights: 0.5 for each adult at home and 0.3 for 
children. 
 
 
35 
 
 
Table 3: Relative Concerns in Rural China with Alternative Model Specifications and Reference Groups 
  Baseline   Alternative Reference Groups  
  Income  
Income per 
Capita 
Log Income 
per Capita   Village 
County + 
Wageworker 
County + Age 
<40 
  I II III   IV V VI 
Total HH income (a)      0.007***      0.015***      0.369***        0.510***      0.384***      0.349*** 
             (0.003) (0.004) (0.100)   (0.111) (0.101) (0.100) 
Mean HH Income in reference group  0.001 -0.014     -0.504**        -0.631***     -0.594**  -0.335 
             (0.009) (0.015) (0.247)   (0.169) (0.240) (0.239) 
R-Squared 0.233 0.234 0.234   0.235 0.234 0.234 
Observations 11624 11624 11624   11624 11624 11624 
Source: RUMiC 2008. Notes: Models estimated using OLS. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
household level are shown in parentheses. Income is measured in 1,000 CNY. Per capita income is calculated using the modified OECD equivalence scale, 
which uses the following weights: 0.5 for each adult at home and 0.3 for children.  
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Table 4: Estimating Relative Remittances: Baseline Estimates, Remittance Receivers, Shifts in Income Rank and Income Inequality  
  Baseline   Remittance Receivers    Reference Groups   Inequality 
  
Whole 
Sample 
Only HH 
Heads   
 HH with 
Remittances 
HH without 
Remittances   
Reference 
Group: 
County + 
Wage 
Workers 
Reference 
Group: 
County + 
age<40 
Reference 
Group: 
County + HH 
with Migrants   
Income 
Inequality in 
Reference 
Groups 
  I II   III IV   V VI VII   VIII 
Log HH income pc TEST      0.340***      0.375***        0.269*        0.406***        0.353***      0.331***      0.285***        0.342*** 
             (0.089) (0.097)   (0.144) (0.119)   (0.090) (0.089) (0.090)   (0.089) 
Mean Log HH income pc in reference group     -0.840***     -0.709***   -0.403     -1.188***       -0.884***     -0.755***     -0.423**        -0.837*** 
             (0.219) (0.238)   (0.405) (0.263)   (0.212) (0.214) (0.210)   (0.220) 
Log  remittances pc 0.07 0.067   0.162     0.073 0.052 -0.011   0.067 
  (0.072) (0.079)   (0.112)     (0.072) (0.072) (0.074)   (0.072) 
Mean Log remittances pc in reference group      0.873***      0.902***        1.062***      0.530**         0.810***      0.921***      1.097***        0.804*** 
             (0.186) (0.200)   (0.303) (0.259)   (0.183) (0.169) (0.181)   (0.198) 
Change in income inequality due to remittances                                  -1.728 
                                  (1.417) 
R-squared 0.238 0.196   0.221 0.266   0.238 0.239 0.239   0.239 
Observations 11624 6063   5270 6354   11624 11624 11624   11624 
Source: RUMiC 2008. Notes: Models estimated using OLS. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at the household 
level are shown in parentheses. Income is measured in 1,000 CNY. Per capita income is calculated using the modified OECD equivalence scale, which uses the following 
weights: 0.5 for each adult at home and 0.3 for children. Income inequality is measured using the GINI coefficient calculated at the county level.  
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Table 5: Heterogeneity 
Economic Activity and Income Distribution  
  Wage earners   Farmers   
% of Wageworkers in county 
above median   Relatively rich county   
Remittances decreased county 
inequality  
  D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0 
Log HH income pc      0.373**       0.323***        0.262**       0.447***        0.534*** 0.152        0.442***      0.242**         0.299***      0.389*** 
             (0.162) (0.096)   (0.111) (0.121)   (0.117) (0.122)   (0.117) (0.122)   (0.115) (0.123) 
County mean Log  HH  income pc     -0.781**      -0.880***       -1.013***     -0.790***       -1.410***     -0.717**        -1.511*** -0.092       -0.616**      -1.090*** 
             (0.353) (0.239)   (0.282) (0.278)   (0.366) (0.343)   (0.461) (0.405)   (0.285) (0.308) 
Log  remittances pc -0.103 0.121   0.016 0.147   0.101 0.059   0.074 0.072   0.050 0.090 
  (0.120) (0.079)   (0.086) (0.098)   (0.095) (0.094)   (0.098) (0.091)   (0.092) (0.098) 
County mean Log remittances pc      0.651**       0.910***        1.247*** 0.359        0.662**       0.975***        0.695**       0.883***        0.872***      0.812*** 
             (0.325) (0.204)   (0.226) (0.266)   (0.326) (0.235)   (0.282) (0.286)   (0.251) (0.293) 
                              
Migration Intensity, Experience and Individual Characteristics 
  HH without migrants   
County ratio of migrants 
above median   Migrated in the past   Older than 40 years old   Education above median 
  D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0   D=1 D=0 
Log HH income pc      0.428***      0.248*          0.298**       0.364***        0.502***      0.305***        0.419*** 0.147        0.224*        0.406*** 
             (0.114) (0.127)   (0.118) (0.120)   (0.178) (0.095)   (0.099) (0.144)   (0.123) (0.106) 
County mean Log  HH pc income     -1.080*** -0.303   -0.225     -1.121***       -0.992**      -0.809***       -0.547**      -1.568***       -0.920***     -0.808*** 
             (0.256) (0.350)   (0.408) (0.251)   (0.433) (0.232)   (0.239) (0.339)   (0.303) (0.250) 
Log  remittances pc      0.250**  -0.096   -0.025 0.144   0.060 0.077   0.044 0.100   0.012 0.093 
  (0.114) (0.092)   (0.090) (0.103)   (0.134) (0.078)   (0.077) (0.141)   (0.106) (0.081) 
County mean Log remittances pc      0.455*        1.408***        1.632*** 0.521        0.894***      0.864***        1.101*** 0.185        0.937***      0.845*** 
             (0.257) (0.245)   (0.264) (0.353)   (0.345) (0.199)   (0.194) (0.370)   (0.260) (0.222) 
Source: RUMiC 2008. Notes: Models estimated using OLS. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are shown in parentheses. Income is measured in 1,000 
CNY. Per capita income is calculated using the modified OECD equivalence scale, which uses the following weights: 0.5 for each adult at home and 0.3 for children. “Relatively rich counties” have a mean household income per 
capita above the median. Income inequality is measured using the GINI coefficient calculated at the county level.  
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Table 6: Robustness, Self-Selection into Migration, and Net Remittances     
  Further Sensitivity Checks   Selection Correction   Net Remittances 
  Ordered Probit  Median Income With GHQ11   
Instrument 1: 
Distance  
Instrument 2: 
Distance, Birth 
Order    
Instrument: 
Distance, Birth 
Order  
Log HH income pc      0.078***      0.337***      0.219***        0.199**       0.197**         0.015*** 
             (0.021) (0.089) (0.068)   (0.084) (0.084)   (0.004) 
County mean Log  HH  income pc     -0.199***     -0.784***     -0.541***       -0.778***     -0.741***       -0.037**  
             (0.048) (0.217) (0.175)   (0.219) (0.217)   (0.016) 
Log  remittances pc 0.016 0.086      0.097*     -0.073 -0.079   0.012 
  (0.016) (0.070) (0.056)   (0.066) (0.066)   (0.008) 
County mean Log remittances pc      0.204***      0.664***      0.619***        0.821***      0.822***        0.031**  
             (0.041) (0.124) (0.147)   (0.185) (0.186)   (0.015) 
Rho (correlation between 
equations)         0.106* 0.108*     
          (0.061) (0.062)     
R-Squared 0.045 0.239 0.437                                 0.235 
Observations 11624 11624 12174   16222 16156   11542 
Notes:  Models are estimated using OLS. Income inequality is measured using the GINI coefficient. See Table 2 for the full specification.  */**/*** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
 
